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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PRIVATIZATION AND
DEMOCRACY: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR ROSE

MARK P. McKENNA*
The broad thesis of Professor Rose’s article Privatization: The Road to
Democracy? is an important reminder that no institution deserves all the credit
for democratization, and that the success of any particular institution in
promoting democracy depends to a greater or lesser extent on the existence and
functioning of other political institutions.1 While protection of private property
has proven quite important to successful democratic reform, we should not be
lulled into thinking private property can carry the whole weight of reform.
That lesson has particular significance in the context of intellectual property,
given proponents’ general tendency to overstate the significance of intellectual
property rights (IPRs) in encouraging innovation.2
But even if they play a small role in promoting democracy, this Paper
argues that IPRs can and do play a role that should not be overlooked. In at
least some cases, IPRs can help create the conditions in which democracy can
succeed. Specifically, copyright protection shifts control over the content of
creative expression away from the government and into the market. In so
doing, copyright encourages development of a pluralistic and independent
culture. At the same time, patent protection, particularly in the modern
economy, can help create the economic conditions that allow for stable civil
society. These arguments, of course, do not justify any and all extensions of an
intellectual property (IP) regime. But they are based on solid evidence and
deserve consideration by policy-makers hoping to promote democracy.

* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University. © 2006 Mark P. McKenna.
1. Carol M. Rose, Privatization: The Road to Democracy?, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 691, 693–
94 (2006) (stating that “privatization and democratic governance cannot be seen simply as
ancestor-to-successor, where the one (privatization) precedes the other (democratization). At
most (to continue the family analogy) privatization and democratization are siblings, co-existing
in a mixed environment of mutual support, dependence, and occasional rivalry”).
2. Michele Boldrin and David Levine have argued that IPRs are not necessary at all to
promote innovation. Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, Perfectly Competitive Innovation 2
(Aug. 28, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.dklevine.com/papers/pcibasic14.pdf (“The
claim that monopoly is necessary for innovation is not correct either as a matter of theory, or as a
matter of fact.”).
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I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS PRIVATIZATION
Before discussing the democratizing effects of IP specifically, I want to
make two points about the way in which Professor Rose frames her thesis.
Though distinct points on some level, both urge a more granular approach to
analyzing intellectual property’s impact in encouraging democracy.
“Intellectual property” is a relatively broad phrase that encompasses several
different rights regimes (patent, copyright, trademark, trade secret, as well as
other related rights), and each of those forms of protection has its own
relationship with democratic development.
A full account of those
relationships is beyond the scope of this short Essay, but I hope to highlight a
couple of ways in which a lack of context-sensitivity might obscure important
aspects of the relationship between particular forms of IP and democratic
society.
A.

The Typology of Privatization

Professor Rose frames her paper around a typology of privatization
measures, identifying “recognition,” “deregulation,” “divestment,” and
“enablement” measures.3 IPRs, according to Professor Rose, are prototypical
“enablement” measures, which she defines as governmental measures to
establish and protect property rights in resources that would otherwise not
easily be turned into property at all.4 This characterization of IP, however,
oversimplifies the role of IPRs because it does not sufficiently account for the
alternatives to particular forms of protection.
The concept of privatization implies a comparison with a prior baseline
state of governmental involvement. To regard something as a privatization
measure is to identify a shift from a system substantially under the control of
the government towards a system substantially dependent on private ordering.
Privatization, in other words, suggests a change from more government
involvement to less. One can describe that change more particularly in a
variety of ways: as a separation of economic decision-making and the public
sphere or as a change in the nature of relationships from cooperative to
competitive and exclusive, for example.5 All of these elucidations, however,
have in common a general sense that governmental involvement has decreased
as compared to the prior baseline level.

3. Rose, supra note 1, at 694–98.
4. Id. at 697.
5. See Shubha Ghosh, Deprivatizing Copyright, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387, 395 (2003).
Ghosh catalogs various definitions of privatization and notes that “[a]lthough much has been
written about privatization, a general definition of the term in the scholarly literature is elusive.”
Id. Ultimately he settles on a definition that focuses on “the delegation of the decision-making
function historically assigned to a governmental entity to a non-governmental entity.” Id.
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What Professor Rose calls “divestiture” measures, those by which whole
enterprises are removed from governmental administration and placed in
private hands, are paradigmatic of this shift.6 “Deregulation,” one of Professor
Rose’s other categories,7 also fits the more-government to less-government
model, because deregulation returns more economic decision-making
responsibility to the private sector. But at least one of Professor Rose’s
examples may run in the opposite direction.
What Professor Rose calls “recognition” measures, those that provide the
administrative means to regularize private property ownership,8 in some sense
introduce greater governmental regulation than the baseline state. Land titling,
for example, is a process through which a government recognizes and enforces
previously inchoate and less stable claims that had been enforced informally.9
Among other things, once land is titled formally owners can rely on the state to
mediate disputes regarding their property rather than resorting to alternative
private enforcement mechanisms.10 Recognition measures, then, represent a
move from less government to more government. There may be consequences
for democratization that flow from such efforts, but in light of the prerecognition level of state involvement, Professor Rose accepts too easily the
characterization of those efforts as privatization measures. And because IP,
which serves as Rose’s example of an “enablement” measure, is in this sense
more analogous to recognition measures than to divestiture or deregulation, it
fits uneasily into the privatization typology.
Professor Rose argues that IPRs “effectively privatize the uses of
inventions and expressions that would otherwise be open to copying by the
general public.”11 I want to suggest, however, that IPRs are better viewed
through a comparative institutional lens. At least some IPRs are grants of
formal rights in place of less formal and less efficient measures that creators
might take to protect the same matter in the absence of formal protection.
Patent law, for example, has long been thought to promote disclosure of
information that companies might not generate or would take inefficient steps
to conceal in the absence of legal protection.12 If the prospect of patent
6. Rose, supra note 1, at 696.
7. Id. at 695.
8. Id. at 694.
9. Id.
10. Id. 703 (discussing the role of barrio insiders who accept payment to protect residents’
informal property claims); Bernadette Atuahene, Land Titling: A Mode of Privatization with the
Potential to Deepen Democracy, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 761, 775–76 (2006) (noting the incentives
that land titling creates to invest in society’s dispute resolution mechanisms).
11. Rose, supra note 1, at 697.
12. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979). Describing the
purpose of the patent system, the Aronson Court maintained that
[f]irst, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it promotes disclosure of
inventions, to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public to practice the
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protection in fact induces disclosure of information that would otherwise
remain secret, then the choice of whether or not to grant patent rights is not
really one between “property” and “free access.” Rather, the choice is a more
complicated one between the modes of protection that creators employ,
assuming they are willing to create at all absent formal legal protection.13
So understood, IPRs sound a good deal like the formal rights granted in
systems of regularized titling: they exist because of concerns that, in their
absence, creators might otherwise take inefficient measures to protect their
interests through more informal mechanisms.14 And while some of those
alternative methods of protection have government backing (trade secret
protection, for example), there is little doubt that, with their registration
systems and administrative apparatus,15 the patent and copyright regimes
reflect much greater government involvement than do the alternatives. That is
true even if one can imagine regimes of even greater governmental
involvement—perhaps systems of direct subsidization of research or patronage
of cultural production like those that characterized the English system prior to
American colonization.16
invention once the patent expires; third, the stringent requirements for patent protection
seek to assure that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the public.
Id.; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1029 (1989).
[I]t seems likely that the patent system at least facilitates disclosure by creating rights in
inventions that survive disclosure. Secrecy makes it difficult for inventors to sell or
license their inventions to others because it is difficult to persuade someone to pay for an
idea without disclosing it, yet once the invention is disclosed, the inventor has nothing left
to sell.
Id. The dilemma that Eisenberg describes as facing inventors is often called the “information
paradox” and that nomenclature is widely credited to Kenneth Arrow. Kenneth J. Arrow,
Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION
OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614–16 (1962).
13. There is a distinction to be drawn here between the objects of patent protection and those
of copyright protection. Patent protection serves two production side functions: to drive
investment towards certain inventions that otherwise would not be pursued and to encourage
disclosure of some inventions that would be produced even in the absence of patent protection.
Copyright law probably does more of the latter since its effect is probably predominantly on the
willingness of distributors to disseminate creative content.
14. See Rose, supra note 1, at 703–04.
15. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–351 (2000).
16. Indeed, if privatization entails some comparison to a baseline condition, then to whatever
extent recognition of intellectual property rights can be described as an instance of privatization,
the privatization happened centuries ago in England. Though the scope of IP protection has
broadened considerably over time, the basic concept of recognizing private rights in intangible
information dates back at least as far as the Statute of Monopolies and the Statute of Anne. See
Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.); Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng).
The decision to recognize private property rights had the effect of shifting from the government to
private parties the authority to decide how resources should be allocated to promote innovation
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Here there is a clear contrast with tradable environmental allowances
(TEAs), another of Professor Rose’s examples of enablement measures.17 Like
IPRs, TEAs are formally created property rights that depend on government
action. TEAs, however, can be distinguished from IPRs because they are
necessary in the first place only because of background government regulation.
Without government regulation of environmental pollutants, the possibility of
and need for TEAs would disappear. Conversely, the need for inventions and
creative output exists independent of any government regulation. The question
for IP policy is how best to encourage production of such works in light of
other societal values.18
B.

Political Criticisms of Privatization Measures

This leads me to my second general concern about Rose’s thesis. Even
accepting Rose’s characterization as privatization efforts of each of the trends
she identifies, Rose’s criticisms of those efforts strike me to some extent as
unfair attempts to evaluate specific instances of privatization against general
normative arguments in favor of private property that may or may not have
motivated the particular privatization effort.
The argument that privatization promotes democracy is a general,
comparative argument that more private control of decision-making is better
for democratic culture than is less private control.19 The specific political
arguments for privatization that Rose identifies—the priority argument, the
power-spreading argument, the distraction argument, the symbolic argument,
and the civilizing argument20—do not necessarily suggest any particular forms
of private property (except perhaps the most fundamental, real property rights),
but rather provide general support for a system that recognizes more private
property, rather than less.
Take as an example the notion that recognizing private property promotes
democracy because it enables commerce, which tends to “soften manners”—
what Rose calls the civilizing argument.21 That argument suggests that trade
and creative production. For more in-depth discussions of the history of patent and copyright
protection, see PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY (1994); Adam Mossoff, Rethinking
the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History 1550–1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255 (2001);
see also Thomas B. Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics of Regulation, 91 VA. L.
REV. 1313, 1315–16 (2005) (detailing the political background of the Statute of Monopolies).
17. See Rose, supra note 1, at 698 nn.36–37 and accompanying text (referring to the United
States’ program for tradable emission rights in the gasses that form acid rain and the European
Union’s proposals to use tradable rights to control carbon dioxide emissions).
18. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283, 285 (1996) (stating that “[c]opyright law’s perennial dilemma is to determine where
exclusive rights should end and unrestrained public access should begin”).
19. See id. at 3.
20. See id. at 15, 19, 26, 31, 37.
21. Id. at 37.
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requires individuals to get to know each other and understand what each other
value, and it acknowledges that private property is a precondition of trade.22
For the most part, the civilizing argument does not depend on what particular
types of property a society chooses to recognize, as long as the forms of
property it recognizes are tradable. Thus, the civilizing argument does not
necessarily support recognition of any particular property, even if it strongly
supports a system of more private property. Criticisms of a particular
privatization effort for failing to civilize then undermine neither the particular
privatization effort nor the civilizing argument generally.
The broader point is that each of the various arguments in favor of private
property that Rose articulates has more or less to say about different forms of
privatization. The political arguments are not exclusive of one another, nor do
they purport to offer totalizing views of privatization. Indeed, some forms of
privatization may not have been based on any of the political arguments but
instead were motivated principally by economic concerns. In those cases,
arguments about how the efforts measure up to the political claims regarding
privatization probably have little to say about their desirability.
For example, Rose criticizes efforts to privatize electric and telephone
service on the ground that electric and telephone company workers sometimes
are rude and offer poor service.23 Similarly, Rose criticizes some divestiture
measures for failing to spread power very far and for failing to act as a
distraction from politics.24 To some extent these are indications that
privatization in some cases has not been done very effectively more than they
are arguments against privatization.25 Even on their own terms, however, it is
not clear that Rose’s arguments demonstrate a failure of privatization. If
divestitures have been primarily economically motivated, and if deregulation
of water was not particularly intended to spread power but simply make the
delivery of water cheaper and more dependable, a goal Rose confirms
privatization largely has met, then the fact that those measures failed to spread
power is probably not a particularly trenchant criticism.
I make this point to stress that, when we are measuring IP against the
political arguments, we should evaluate different intellectual property regimes
independently of one another. “Intellectual property” is a big tent, and the
various forms of protection are motivated to some extent by different concerns.
22. See id. at 37.
23. Rose, supra note 1, at 707–10.
24. Id. at 699–700.
25. Questions about how well privatization is done clearly have a lot to do with the state of
underlying political institutions, and in that sense, Rose’s thesis is undeniably true.
Privatization’s ability to deliver on its promises depends on political institutions and their
willingness and ability to perform a variety of functions fairly and effectively. But we should not
lose track of the dynamic effect of privatization and its potential for incremental change of the
political institutions themselves.
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Copyright proponents, for example, have relied on political arguments much
more explicitly than have patent proponents.26 As a result, copyright law is
more susceptible to criticism on political grounds, whereas some political
criticisms of patent law, like the political criticisms of deregulation, probably
seem to patent proponents and policy makers neither here nor there.
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEMOCRACY
Even if intellectual property does not fit neatly into Rose’s privatization
scheme, there are at least a couple of ways in which IP rights impact
democracy that can be directly evaluated. At risk of redundancy, granularity is
important here. The democratic impact of copyright protection is quite
different than that of patent protection. By lumping all of IP together, in my
view Professor Rose misses the opportunity to evaluate the particular effects of
specific rights.
A.

Copyright and Democratic Expression

First, copyright scholars have long argued that copyright promotes
diversity of cultural expression, which is good for democracy.27 Copyright
protects individuals in their expression and makes the success or failure of that
expression a function of the market, rather than the whim of the sovereign. By
contrast, pre-Statute of Anne regulatory systems were intimately related to
censorship.28 In medieval England, for both political and economic reasons,
the Crown awarded to individual printers the exclusive right to print particular
books.29 Later the Crown vested the Stationers Company with a monopoly
over publishing and relied on it to censor political dissent.30 As Goldstein
observed, the printers enjoyed and enforced a monopoly over publishing, but
the printers were only allowed to publish books licensed by the Crown.31
26. See Netanel, supra note 18, at 347–64 (stating that copyright law supports democracy
through encouragement of creative expression of political and social ideas and through giving the
creators of such expression financial support).
27. See, e.g., id. (arguing that copyright is a state measure that uses market institutions to
enhance the democratic character of civil society, by serving production and structural functions).
The notion that copyright is intended to promote democratic society dates back to the founding
era and can be seen in discussion of the first federal copyright statute in 1790. See id. at 289 &
n.17 (citing BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 137
(1967)).
28. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 40.
29. See id. (“By granting an exclusive right—a patent, it was called—to print particular
literary or legal or educational works to a given bookseller, the English sovereigns were able to
tap into a continuing stream of loyalty and income.”). For other thorough discussions of English
copyright history, see LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
(1968) and BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT (1967).
30. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 42.
31. Id.
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Thus, the Crown could rely on the Stationers Company to carry out its political
will.
Under [the Licensing Act], the Crown determined what works could be
published; under the printing patent, the Stationers suppressed trade not only in
unauthorized copies of licensed works, but in unlicensed works as well. The
Stationers got the economic rewards of monopoly; in return, the Crown got
from the Stationers a ruthlessly efficient enforcer of the censorship.32

By recognizing copyright in authors and rejecting royal privileges in
printing, the modern copyright system stripped the sovereign of an effective
control over the content of publications, leaving to market forces the ultimate
fate of a particular publication. This development, to be sure, was not an
unqualified good. One potential advantage of government subsidization of
intellectual production is that it allows for consideration of factors beyond
potential economic success, and we might have good reason to think that
certain forms of expression that are not economically valuable are nevertheless
desirable. In those cases, the market might not properly reflect true societal
demand, and those forms of expression will be under-produced.33
Governments in the United States and in Great Britain, among other
countries, have recognized that risk, and for that reason copyright has never
been the only way in which either country encourages cultural production. As
Shubha Ghosh points out, governments also subsidize cultural infrastructure,
“create cultural inputs that benefit private associations,” and can “aid in
establishing rules that facilitate private associations.”34 Governments also can
provide direct grants to certain producers of cultural material, through entities
like the National Endowment for the Arts.35
But if democracy is our concern, there are at least as many reasons to be
concerned about other forms of government encouragement of cultural
production as there are about leaving those decisions to the market. Grant and
infrastructure funding are very likely to follow political winds, as we have seen
with regard to funding of National Public Radio, the Public Broadcasting
Service, and the National Endowment for the Arts.36 As these modern
examples make clear, those who control the funding are likely to want to

32. Id.
33. See Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 965 (2005) (noting that the market often does not accurately
measure or respond to societal demand).
34. Ghosh, supra note 5, at 411.
35. See generally id. at 411–12.
36. See Rob Owen, ‘Politics Theater’ Drags on at PBS, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July
14, 2005, at W-37 (“Maintaining its government funding has been an issue for the entirety of
PBS’s existence, but lately the media company has found itself wandering through a political
minefield.”).
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control the content of the creative output they fund.37 As Justice Scalia noted
in a recent speech about government funding of the arts, it has long been the
case that “he who pays the piper calls the tune.”38 The risk that governments
which fund content will seek to call the creative tune is a lesson history teaches
exceedingly well.
In the final analysis, modern copyright law reflects a belief that we are
better off relying on markets to provide the incentives for cultural production.39
Though markets sometimes fail, the possibility of failure has to be measured
against the political risks inherent in greater government involvement in
production.40
The scope of copyright law will have a lot to say about how well it furthers
the goal of democratization, of course, as we are reminded by criticisms of
copyright’s effect on culture.41 Overly broad protection threatens to stifle the
very expressive freedom copyright protection promises. If, however, marketdriven copyright systems by and large succeed in creating environments in
which diverse views flourish, then copyright, on balance, helps create
democratic culture.42

37. In 1999, the Brooklyn Museum of Art sued the City of New York when the city withheld
funding for the Museum because Mayor Giuliani was offended by some of the art the museum
displayed, particularly a painting that depicted the Virgin Mary decorated with elephant dung.
Brooklyn Inst. of Arts & Sci. v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184, 186, 190 (E.D.N.Y.
1999). The court entered a preliminary injunction against the City on the ground that the decision
to withhold funding violated the First Amendment. Id. at 205.
38. See Daniel J. Wakin, Scalia Defends Government’s Right to Deny Art Funds, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2005, at B5. The saying generally is attributed to the fable of the Pied Piper of
Hamelin. J. A. Spittal, He Who Pays the Piper Calls the Tune (2003), http://www.cambridge
conference2003.com/camconf/papers/3-2.pdf#search=‘he%20who%20pays%20the%20piper%20
calls%20the%20tune‘.
39. See Netanel, supra note 18, at 345–48.
40. The distinction I have drawn is between the market on the one hand and government
subsidization on the other. There is, of course, a third possibility that has sometimes played a
historical role—the support of elite patrons. Relying on that type of support lessens to some
degree the risk of undue government control of content, but it does little to ensure the type of
diverse selection of views characteristic of democratic societies. Cf. id. at 288–89 (arguing that
“‘sustained works of authorship’—books, articles, films, songs and paintings—form a central part
of democratic discourse, and that a robust copyright is a necessary (though not necessarily
sufficient) condition both for the creation and dissemination of that expression and for its
independent and pluralist character”).
41. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (Penguin
Press, 2004).
42. See Barbara Ringer, Two Hundred Years of American Copyright Law, in TWO HUNDRED
YEARS OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW 117, 118 (Am.
Bar Assoc. ed., 1977) (“We know, empirically, that strong copyright systems are characteristic of
relatively free societies.”).
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IP and Conditions Precedent to Democracy

There is another way in which IPRs have an effect on democratization.
Recognition of IPRs is one way to promote the economic conditions conducive
to democratic development. A growing body of research suggests that
intellectual property protection can have a significant effect on a country’s
economic prosperity.43 Countries that protect intellectual property achieve
greater foreign investment and raise their citizens’ standards of living
substantially faster.44 This should hardly come as a surprise. IPRs are
intended to promote innovation, and innovation has a significant effect on
economic growth.45

43. See Carsten Fink & Carlos A. Primo Braga, How Stronger Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights Affects International Trade Flows, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
DEVELOPMENT 19, 20 (Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT] (finding that stronger IPRs have a significantly positive effect on
total trade, though also finding stronger patent rights irrelevant for certain high-technology
products); Beata Smarzynksa Javorcik, The Composition of Foreign Direct Investment and
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights: Evidence from Transition Economies, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT, supra, at 133, 134 (study of multinational
companies’ investment decisions; finding that weak IPRs have a negative effect on the likelihood
of investments being made and that companies avoid investing in local production when IPRs are
weak and instead focus on distribution). In the introduction, the editors conclude that the
empirical evidence points to a positive role for IPRs in stimulating formal technology transfer,
through foreign direct investment in production and research and development facilities and
through cross-border technology licensing. Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus, Why We Study
Intellectual Property Rights and What We Have Learned, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
DEVELOPMENT, supra, at 1, 8.
44. See generally Lee G. Branstetter et al., Do Stronger Intellectual Property Rights
Increase International Technology Transfer? Empirical Evidence from U.S. Firm-Level Data,
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 11516, 2005), http://www.people.hbs.edu/
ffoley/IPRReform.pdf (presenting statistical analysis of firm-level data on U.S. multinational
companies conducted at the International Investment Division, Bureau of Economic Analysis,
U.S. Department of Commerce and concluding that their “results collectively imply that U.S.
multinationals respond to changes in IPR regimes abroad by significantly increasing technology
transfer to reforming countries” and that research and development spending by affiliates
increases after IPR reform). Research on the impact of stronger IPR on domestic innovation in
particular is mixed. See id. at 2 n.3 (citing studies from 1995, 2000, 2001, and 2002 that find no
impact on domestic innovation and other studies from 2001 and 2005 that do find an impact).
45. Recognizing intellectual property rights is not the only way in which countries can
promote innovation. See Press Release, European Commission, State Aid: Commission Launches
Public Consultation on Measures to Improve State Aid for Innovation, (Sept. 21, 2005),
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/1169&format=HTML&aged=
0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. The Press Release discusses the measures states can take to
promote innovation under the Communication on State Aid for Innovation, including:
1) support for the creation and growth of innovative start-ups (through tax exemptions and
subsidies);
2) additional flexibility for state aid to risk capital;
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And economic growth and stability clearly aid democratic development.
As today’s world events make clear, it is very difficult to build a stable
political environment when citizens are excluded from the prosperity shared by
the developed world. I do not mean here only that property and commerce
distract people from other strife,46 although that certainly may be true, but
rather that divergent economic conditions sometimes are themselves the source
of discontent in developing areas.47 Rose herself provides evidence of this
dynamic when she points to India’s experience with privatization and notes
that the Congress Party and its allies defeated the BJP, the chief sponsor of
India’s deregulation efforts, largely because of the dissatisfaction of rural
citizens who felt they were left out of the good economic times.48 If
intellectual property aids technology transfer and helps create greater economic
opportunity, it can help create the stability on which civil society depends.
There is also a power-spreading argument to be made here, though a less
direct one. According to the power-spreading thesis, private property
promotes democracy because ownership of private property gives citizens a
sense of security that enables their participation in the political process.49 That
thesis then argues for recognition of any private rights that offer greater
economic security than citizens previously enjoyed. Intellectual property
rights can offer that security, not so much because ownership of intellectual
property rights is widespread, but because recognition of IPRs enables greater
economic growth.
This point should not be overstated; Rose rightly cautions against giving
any institution too much credit for democratization.50 Even the most optimistic
economic reports echo Rose’s important caveat that the effectiveness of IP
reform depends on the existence of other governmental institutions in which

3) expanding the scope of current state aid rules for Research and Development and
authorising state aid for SMEs [small- and medium-sized enterprises] engaged in
innovation activities (such as commercially-usable prototypes, technological design or
feasibility studies);
4) subsidies for SMEs to buy services from innovation intermediaries;
5) subsidies for SMEs to recruit highly qualified researchers and engineers and to benefit
from exchange of personnel with universities and large companies; and
6) supporting the development of poles of excellence through collaboration, clustering,
and projects of common European interest.
Id.
46. See Rose, supra note 1, at 710.
47. See generally Juan Forero, Latin America Fails to Deliver on Basic Needs, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 2005, at A1 (illustrating that the high cost of utility services in countries like Bolivia
contributes to political instability).
48. See id. at 28–29.
49. See Rose, supra note 1, at 705–10.
50. See id. at 693 (stating that “privatization alone cannot do all the work of
democratization”).
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the rights can be maintained and enforced.51 So it cannot be said that
recognition of IPRs is a sufficient, or even necessary, condition for democratic
reform. But there are two general conclusions we can draw from the evidence:
(1) it is no accident that most of the world’s unrest is taking place in
developing countries; and (2) recognition of IPRs clearly has a positive effect
on economic conditions, which can help create greater stability. Thus, IPRs
deserve a seat at the policy table when democratization is the goal.
C. Other Democratization Issues Relating to IP
Rose makes two additional observations that are potentially relevant to the
question of the impact of IPRs. First, Rose notes that the privatization efforts
might arouse rather than dampen political passions if the effort affects those
with vested interests.52 This seems much more likely to be a possibility in the
deregulation context,53 and very unlikely to apply in the context of intellectual
property. As I discussed earlier, unlike deregulation, in the context of IP there
is no “status quo” that is affected by any particular movement. Indeed, it is
hard in the IP context even to identify a particular shift in vested interests that
might arouse opposition, since the subjects of IP protection come into
existence simultaneously with protection. Thus, recognition of IPRs is not
likely to shift the use of already existing assets, as water deregulation might.54
Finally, what about IP’s symbolic role? Rose argues that IP represents an
area of privatization which “cuts fairly sharply” against the symbolic argument
because IP is more a lesson in other people’s rights than in one’s own.55 That
really is an empirical claim about how most people regard IP rights, and my
sense is that it has the greatest purchase in the context of copyright. The fight
against file sharing has had little effect on norms, other than to harden the

51. See Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus, supra note 43, at 2, 12 (stating that “the effects of
awarding stronger rights to protect technology will depend on the underlying circumstances in
each country” and “a reformed legal regime is likely to be a necessary but not sufficient condition
for local technology development”).
52. See Rose, supra note 1, at 711.
53. With respect to deregulation, it might be true that, in the short run, privatization efforts
would have to confront resistance from those with vested interests. But if it is true in the long
run, then one wonders whether the effort really would enhance overall welfare. If it is just an
interested group opposing, then presumably the rest of the people would have a greater interest
and cause greater unrest if the system was not fixed to benefit them.
54. See id. at 711. A possible exception might be industries that depend for their existence
on the absence of strong IPRs, perhaps makers of generic pharmaceuticals.
55. Id. at 715 (“[M]ost people perceive themselves as obligated by IP rights, since the rights
belong to others.”).
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resistance of some.56 Rose’s claim certainly has resonance with regard to
pharmaceutical drugs as well.57
But just because powerful companies and industrialized nations have used
their power to structure IP regimes to benefit themselves
disproportionately58—a dynamic not unique to IP but pervasive in any property
regime and indeed any system of government regulation—does not mean that
IP necessarily favors Goliath. Indeed, the symbolic story is a little murkier
than Rose lets on. In the patent context, and to a lesser extent in the copyright
context, there are many recent stories of IP serving as the sword of David.
Microsoft has been named as a defendant in numerous recent patent cases,59
and some of the smaller plaintiffs in those cases have won substantial
verdicts.60 Indeed, IP might be the only thing that allows the Davids of the
technology world to compete with Microsoft at all; in the absence of IP rights,
Microsoft can bring its greater resources to bear on any good idea and reap all
of the benefits.
That IP-like rights can work in the little guy’s favor is demonstrated by
Rose’s suggestion that the “dictatorial edges” of IP can be softened in part by
recognizing a form of IP protection for folklore or traditional knowledge,
subjects that have heretofore been excluded from the IP regime.61 That
suggestion reflects a recognition of the power of property rights—the solution
to overly aggressive practices, at least in some cases, is property. Here, like in
the examples above, the little guy can use property to fend off the imperialists.
Rose argues that this undermines the legitimacy of the IP incentive theory,62
56. See David Scharfenberg, Defying a Music Industry Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
2006, at 14WC-3 (stating that some data reflect growth in file sharing in the last two years while
other data suggest a downturn).
57. See Rose, supra note 1, at 716 & accompanying notes.
58. See id. at 616–17.
59. Peter Galli, Microsoft Settles with InterTrust, EWEEK.COM, Apr. 12, 2004,
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1565851,00.asp.
60. A district court awarded Eolas, a company spun off from the University of California,
$521 million for Microsoft’s infringement of Eolas’s Web browser patent. See Eolas Tech. Inc.
v. Microsoft Corp., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1939 (N.D. Ill. 2004), vacated in part, 339 F.3d 1325, 1332,
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 568 (2005). The verdict may be reduced when it
ultimately returns to the district court, if the case is not settled first.
61. See Rose, supra note 1, at 716–17. The historical exclusion of these forms of expression
from the IP regime is a good example of Rose’s central thesis—that the ability of private property
to fulfill its political role depends in part on the underlying political institutions. See generally id.
One possible conclusion is that these kinds of distributional concerns are so pervasive that no
property regime can possibly achieve its theoretical ends—that allocation of property rights is
very likely to be drawn according to political power, so that the existence of property rights will
do little to affect politics. But my own view is that the distributional problems, while real and
needing to be accounted for, have not undermined property’s generally positive influence on
politics.
62. Id. at 717.
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but the utilitarian incentive justification need not be the only basis of
protection. Property can and does serve autonomy interests.63
III. CONCLUSION
To summarize, the overwhelming evidence confirms Rose’s broad thesis
that IPRs are far from sufficient to secure democracy, and that we should pay
close attention to scope. But when we parse out the different forms of
intellectual property protection, the evidence also suggests that the case for
IPRs as promoters of democracy is somewhat stronger than Rose lets on.
Thus, intellectual property deserves its seat at the policy table, and we are wise
to pay it some heed.

63. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957
(1982).

